Security summary
This page answers the questions a municipal IT cell, a funder or an NGO board usually asks before records are placed in StrayPaw. It can be printed or saved as a PDF from your browser.
Architecture
StrayPaw is a web application. The application runs on Vercel; data, files and sign-in are held in a managed Postgres database on Supabase. All connections use TLS. There is no software to install: it runs in a browser and can be added to a phone's home screen.
Access control
- Enforced in the database. Row-level security decides every read and write by organisation and role. The interface hiding a button is never the control.
- Organisation isolation. An organisation's records are readable only by its own members. A reviewing office sees only packages submitted to it.
- Roles. Admin, coordinator, veterinarian and field member. Only a veterinarian's own account can authorise a procedure; only an admin or lead can add or remove people.
- Sign-in. An email address and a six-character code sent to that address. No passwords are stored. The sign-in screen does not reveal whether an address has an account, and attempts are rate limited per address and per connection.
- New organisations. An organisation that registers itself is unverified, unlisted and absent from every public page until StrayPaw has checked it.
Integrity and audit
- Every change records who made it and when. Deletions are archived and can be restored by an admin.
- A signed-off procedure is not edited silently: it is returned, corrected and authorised again, and each step stays in the history.
- Imported historical records are labelled as imported and are not counted as verified work until a person confirms them.
- Report packages record every acceptance, query and return with the reviewer and the time.
The assistant (Kaju)
- Kaju reads with the signed-in person's own access and can see nothing they cannot.
- Kaju prepares; a person confirms. It cannot approve a procedure, accept a claim or save a change on its own.
- Today Kaju answers from your records with built-in tools. No record is sent to an AI model provider. Model-backed answers are off, can be switched on only by the owner with a spending limit, and organisations will be told first.
- Records are never used to train AI models.
Privacy
- Public pages show areas, never an animal's exact point. Reporter identity and veterinary notes are private.
- Photos that may show an injury start blurred. Community reports are checked before publication.
- Offline field records are stored encrypted on the phone until they are sent.
- Usage counting is first-party only, with an opt-out; there is no advertising or cross-site tracking.
Patient data in One Health programmes
- Bite exposures, treatment courses, doses and reminder calls live in a separate
healthschema that the web API cannot reach. They are read and written only through functions that check the person's facility and role. - A person is identified by the facility's own register number. There is no field for a name. A phone number is kept only when the person agreed to reminder calls.
- NGOs, the programme lead and Kaju never open an individual bite record. When a facility refers someone, the receiving facility sees the bite code, its category and what is needed, never who the person is.
- Programme figures under five are shown as "fewer than 5", never exactly.
- Opening a bite record, and every change to it, is written to an audit trail that the database refuses to edit or delete.
How these statements are checked
- Every change runs the same automated gate before it can be merged: type checks, the production build, regression scripts and about 250 browser tests.
- A permission suite signs in as each kind of person on the staging demonstration and confirms who can and cannot read or change what: today 25 checks, covering patient records, other cities' programmes, referrals and small counts.
- A separate suite confirms that Kaju's tools read only what the person may read and never touch patient records.
- These are our own tests, not an independent audit; see below.
Data ownership and exit
An organisation owns its records. Registers, evidence and reports export to Excel, CSV and PDF at any time, and a workspace can be deleted on request. See Data processing for sub-processors, retention and incident notice.
Operations
- Changes are deployed from version control after automated checks; database changes are applied deliberately and one at a time, never concurrently.
- The database provider takes managed backups. A restore has not been rehearsed against a recovery-time target; see below.
- Current availability is shown live on the Status page.
What is not in place yet
These are stated plainly so that no tender or review is misled.
- No ISO 27001, SOC 2 or government empanelment.
- No independent penetration test or external audit has been completed.
- The database is not hosted in an Indian region today. Ask us if your contract requires it.
- No published uptime history or service-level commitment outside a written programme agreement.
- No documented, rehearsed recovery-time or recovery-point objective.
- No single sign-on (SAML or OIDC) for organisations.
Reporting a vulnerability
Write to us through the Contact page with the details. We reply, fix and, if you wish, credit you.